Flashcards
Every isolation technology and coding agent, as a deck. Read the name, recall what it is, then flip to check. Your progress is saved in this browser.
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Linux Security Modules (LSM)
click to flipA kernel framework of hook points at every security-relevant decision, where a pluggable module answers allow or deny.
Open entry →seccomp-BPF
click to flipA Linux facility that filters which a process may make, expressed as a BPF (Berkeley Packet Filter) program over the number and scalar arguments.
Open entry →Landlock
click to flipThe first unprivileged, self-imposed Linux Security Module (): a process sandboxes itself with access rules over real kernel objects.
Open entry →Linux namespaces
click to flipThe kernel feature that gives a process a private view of a global resource, mounts, PIDs, network, users, the building block of containers.
Open entry →cgroups v2
click to flipThe kernel mechanism that meters and limits a group of processes' CPU, memory, I/O, and PIDs.
Open entry →Linux capabilities
click to flipThe kernel's split of root's monolithic power into ~40 discrete privileges that can be granted or dropped individually.
Open entry →OverlayFS
click to flipThe union filesystem container engines use by default for images: read-only layers stacked under one writable layer, with copy-on-write.
Open entry →AppArmor
click to flipA path-based Linux Security Module where an administrator writes per-application profiles enforced system-wide.
Open entry →SELinux
click to flipA label-based Linux Security Module enforcing a comprehensive, system-wide mandatory access policy.
Open entry →Seatbelt (macOS App Sandbox)
click to flipmacOS's built-in process sandbox, driven by SBPL profiles via sandbox-exec / sandbox_init.
Open entry →bubblewrap
click to flipAn unprivileged sandboxing tool that confines a process by building it a private mount-namespace filesystem view.
Open entry →@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime
click to flipAnthropic's standalone process-sandbox library, Seatbelt on macOS, bubblewrap + seccomp on Linux, behind one interface with an proxy.
Open entry →nono
click to flipA cross-platform agent sandbox using Landlock + seccomp on Linux and Seatbelt on macOS, with an L7 credential-injecting proxy.
Open entry →Docker
click to flipThe ubiquitous container runtime, namespaces + cgroups + a default seccomp/AppArmor profile, that shares the host kernel.
Open entry →Podman
click to flipA daemonless, rootless-friendly container engine, drop-in compatible with Docker's CLI.
Open entry →containerd
click to flipThe core container runtime that manages the container lifecycle beneath Docker and Kubernetes.
Open entry →runc
click to flipThe standard OCI runtime: the low-level executor that assembles namespaces, cgroups, and seccomp into a running container.
Open entry →crun
click to flipA fast, low-memory OCI runtime written in C, the default executor under Podman.
Open entry →Incus
click to flipA system-container and VM manager (LXC/LXD lineage) with one CLI for both, the low-friction Linux isolation choice.
Open entry →gVisor (runsc)
click to flipGoogle's userspace kernel that intercepts a container's , shrinking host-kernel attack surface without a VM.
Open entry →Sysbox
click to flipA container runtime giving user-namespace isolation and Docker-in-Docker without --privileged, hardened, still shared-kernel.
Open entry →KVM
click to flipThe Linux kernel's built-in , turning the kernel into a type-1 using CPU virtualization extensions.
Open entry →Hypervisor.framework
click to flipApple's low-level API, the macOS equivalent of KVM, exposing hardware virtualization to userspace .
Open entry →Windows Hypervisor Platform
click to flipMicrosoft's API exposing Hyper-V's hardware virtualization to third-party userspace , the Windows KVM analog.
Open entry →Virtualization.framework
click to flipApple's high-level VM API on top of .framework, the modern way to run Linux VMs on Apple Silicon.
Open entry →Firecracker
click to flipAWS's minimal virtual machine monitor that boots a with its own kernel in ~125ms, built for running untrusted multi-tenant code.
Open entry →Cloud Hypervisor
click to flipA Rust on KVM, more featureful than Firecracker, that confines itself with Landlock as its second wall.
Open entry →QEMU
click to flipThe veteran, feature-complete machine emulator and , full device model, full cross-architecture emulation.
Open entry →libkrun
click to flipAn embeddable, in-process exposed as a C library, the engine under krunvm, Podman+krun, smolvm, and microsandbox.
Open entry →otterlink
click to flipCognition's homegrown behind Devin, paired with a blockdiff snapshot format for fast fork/rollback.
Open entry →Kata Containers
click to flipAn OCI/Kubernetes runtime that transparently runs each container inside its own lightweight VM (Firecracker/Cloud /QEMU).
Open entry →krunvm
click to flipPodman + krun
click to flipPodman with the krun runtime, run an OCI container as a with the familiar podman CLI.
Open entry →smolvm
click to flipA cross-platform CLI that runs OCI images as libkrun with secure defaults, network off, mounts opt-in, packable into portable .smolmachine files.
Open entry →microsandbox
click to flipA self-hostable sandbox that boots OCI images in ~100ms via libkrun, with a careful filesystem-passthrough and model.
Open entry →Apple container
click to flipApple's first-party tool that runs each OCI container inside its own lightweight VM on Virtualization.framework.
Open entry →Multipass
click to flipCanonical's tool for spinning up Ubuntu VMs with a single command, on KVM (Linux) or HVF (macOS).
Open entry →Lima
click to flipLinux VMs on macOS with automatic file sharing and port forwarding, the engine under Colima.
Open entry →Colima
click to flipA macOS container runtime that boots a Docker/containerd host inside a Lima Linux VM, a free Docker Desktop alternative.
Open entry →OrbStack
click to flipA fast, proprietary macOS app for running Docker containers and Linux machines on Virtualization.framework.
Open entry →UTM
click to flipA GUI VM app for macOS, running guests on Virtualization.framework (fast) or QEMU (any architecture).
Open entry →Tart
click to flipA CI-focused macOS/Linux VM tool on Virtualization.framework, with OCI-registry distribution of VM images.
Open entry →arrakis
click to flipA self-hosted sandbox for agent code execution on Cloud , notable for snapshot-and-backtrack and for a badly stale engine pin.
Open entry →E2B
click to flipA sandbox platform that runs code in Firecracker , with per-sandbox network isolation, self-hostable or hosted.
Open entry →Modal
click to flipA serverless compute platform that isolates workloads with gVisor, stronger than runc, weaker than a hardware VM.
Open entry →Daytona
click to flipA dev-environment sandbox platform whose self-hosted default was measured as a privileged runc container, despite 'dedicated kernel' marketing.
Open entry →Freestyle
click to flipA cloud platform that gives AI agents full Linux VMs, provisioned in under a second with live forking and pause/resume.
Open entry →VS Code Dev Containers
click to flipA Docker container as your whole dev environment, real reproducibility and process separation, but a convenience boundary, not a hard one.
Open entry →GitHub Codespaces
click to flipA dev container inside a dedicated per-codespace VM, the real VM boundary that local dev containers lack.
Open entry →OpenAI Codex CLI
click to flipThe only major coding-agent CLI that is sandboxed by default: workspace-write, network off.
Open entry →Claude Code
click to flipHas a real native sandbox, but it is opt-in, the default posture runs with your full privileges behind approval prompts.
Open entry →Gemini CLI
click to flipSandbox is off by default; on Linux the only isolation option is a container (Docker/Podman), not native confinement.
Open entry →Qwen Code
click to flipA Gemini CLI fork with the same posture: sandbox off by default, container-only isolation on Linux.
Open entry →Aider
click to flipNo OS-level isolation at all, it runs with your full privileges, gated only by approval prompts.
Open entry →Goose
click to flipNo OS-level isolation, it runs with your full privileges, gated only by approval prompts.
Open entry →Amp
click to flipNo OS-level isolation, it runs with your full privileges, gated only by approval prompts.
Open entry →Zed
click to flipThe local IDE outlier: an OS sandbox is on by default for its terminal/fetch tools.
Open entry →Cursor
click to flipRuns commands with full privileges plus a best-effort sandbox the vendor explicitly calls 'not a security boundary'.
Open entry →Windsurf / Cascade
click to flipRuns local commands with your full privileges, gated only by approval prompts; strong isolation is a separate cloud product.
Open entry →Cline
click to flipRuns local commands with your full privileges, gated only by approval prompts; no local OS sandbox.
Open entry →Roo Code
click to flipRuns local commands with your full privileges, gated only by approval prompts and prefix allow/deny lists.
Open entry →Continue.dev
click to flipRuns local commands with your full privileges, gated only by approval prompts and permission lists.
Open entry →GitHub Copilot CLI
click to flipLocal, full privileges by default ('same access as you'); an opt-in preview sandbox and a --cloud mode exist.
Open entry →Copilot VS Code agent
click to flipRuns local commands with your full privileges, gated only by approval prompts; no built-in sandbox.
Open entry →Copilot coding agent
click to flipThe async PR bot runs in an ephemeral GitHub Actions VM with the best-documented default-on firewall of any tool here.
Open entry →Devin
click to flipThe best-documented closed agent and the only one that names its primitive: a homegrown otterlink .
Open entry →Google Jules
click to flipRuns a fresh GCP VM per task, but the underlying isolation technology is undisclosed.
Open entry →Replit Agent
click to flipMid-migration from hardened seccomp-bpf containers to ; a given user may be on either backend today.
Open entry →OpenHands
click to flipOpen-source: each session runs in a Docker container by default (host network off).
Open entry →SWE-agent
click to flipOpen-source: a container per task (via SWE-ReX), built for massively parallel runs.
Open entry →Factory (Droids)
click to flipAsserts cloud sandboxing but does not disclose the isolation technology; its local droid exec CLI has no OS isolation.
Open entry →Cosine Genie
click to flipRuns in an ephemeral cloud workspace, but the isolation technology is undisclosed.
Open entry →Zencoder (Zenflow)
click to flipRuns hundreds of ephemeral cloud sandboxes in parallel, but the isolation technology is undisclosed.
Open entry →